Vol. 21 opens with a scene the editor uses to set the entire issue’s tone: at a Hindu temple in New Delhi in April 1947, Gandhi had just begun reading a prayer from the Koran when an outraged young man charged the stage. A woman moved to intervene, but Gandhi asked that no one stand between him and the man. When the protester was subsequently ejected from the temple, Gandhi chastised those who removed him — they should have “won him over with love.” Ten months before his assassination by a Hindu nationalist, the Mahatma was holding firm to nonviolence not merely as strategy but as spirit and way of life. Editor Greg Moses, writing from Austin in December 2021, uses that moment to weave together an issue that moves from the historical roots of Gandhian nationhood to the most pressing contemporary questions of how nonviolence is practiced, theorized, and transmitted. The issue’s title, “Holding Firm to Nonviolence in Spirit, Theory, and Practice,” names both Gandhi’s tenacity in 1947 and the challenge that every contribution in the issue takes up — whether the scene is India and the United States in an age of resurgent ethnonationalism, the history of philosophical method from Socrates to King, the dialogue-as-form of pragmatic nonviolence, the evolutionary social ethics of Jane Addams, or the networks of fierce loving resistance that professional activists have built and tested over decades.
The issue’s special feature is a university lecture by Rajmohan Gandhi — Gandhi’s grandson, biographer, and a historian who has spent decades moving between the US and India. His talk, “Nationhood Today in the US and India: Learning with Gandhi,” offers a historian’s diagnosis of the twin ethnonationalisms now threatening two of the world’s great constitutional democracies. Rajmohan Gandhi begins with the constitutional premise that both nations share: being an American or an Indian is not a matter of race, religion, or ancestral origin but of living within a polity committed to equal rights. He then traces his grandfather’s lifelong insistence on a pluralist Indian nationhood — articulated in Hind Swaraj in 1909, encoded in the Karachi Resolution of 1931, and defended at mortal cost in Gandhi’s last year — against both Muslim separatism and the Hindu nationalist drive to make “Indian” synonymous with “Hindu.” The grandson’s story is vivid: the “Howdy Modi” rally in Houston in September 2019 and the “Namaste Trump” rally in Ahmedabad in February 2020 — each an ominous exchange of signals between the champions of Hindutva and White nationalism — are read as a joint assault on the civic understanding of nationhood that both constitutions enshrine. Rajmohan Gandhi brings a personal witness to the argument: after he wrote a public article asking Prime Minister Modi whether Muslims were included in his address to “sisters and brothers,” a Hindu nationalist emailed him to say that “your grandfather left us to live with termites for all the times to come.” He cites the exchange not to dramatize the insult but as a precise register of what is at stake — the dehumanization of a minority that is 14.5 percent of India’s population and holds a 5 percent share in parliament. Mahatma Gandhi’s constitutionalism, Rajmohan argues, must be advocated with courage and love in both countries if the world’s great diverse democracies are to hold.
Andrew Fiala contributes the issue’s theoretical article, “Philosophical Peace and Methodological Nonviolence,” coining a term to name something the philosophical tradition has largely left implicit. Fiala’s central claim is that philosophy as a practice is committed, at its methodological core, to nonviolence: it proceeds by rational argument and persuasion rather than physical force, and that commitment holds even for philosophers who argue in favor of justified violence. The argument is transcendental — when someone writes a philosophical defense of violence, the act of writing and arguing is itself nonviolent, because violence and philosophy are qualitatively different kinds of activity. Fists and guns end philosophical discourse; they do not participate in it. Fiala traces this methodological commitment from Socrates — who in the Crito refuses to return evil for evil and in the Republic insists that nothing produced by force stays with the soul — through the Stoics, Kant’s kingdom of ends, Rousseau’s distinction between force and persuasion, and the crucial historical pivot of Tolstoy, who made the implicit explicit: violence is irrational, and rational ends demand rational means. From Tolstoy, the line runs to Gandhi’s unity of means and ends (satyagraha as “truth-force”), to King’s formulation that the end is preexistent in the means, and to Jane Addams’s model of cooperative social inquiry. The editor’s introduction draws the connection to the opening Gandhi anecdote directly: when Gandhi refused to let anyone stand between him and the protester, he was enacting precisely the methodological nonviolence Fiala describes — insisting that the force of persuasion be given its chance, even under threat.
The issue’s Author Meets Critics feature turns the theory of nonviolent dialogue into its own medium. Andrew Fitz-Gibbon presents his book Pragmatic Nonviolence: Working toward a Better World, written as a philosophical play in four acts whose four characters — Anna the Anabaptist theologian, Rivka the analytical philosopher, Clayton the philosophical Daoist and taijiquan instructor, and Jack the pragmatic nonviolentist — enact the deliberative process the book argues for. Fitz-Gibbon’s central definition is precise: nonviolence is “a practice that, whenever possible, seeks the well-being of the Other, by refusing to use violence to solve problems, and by having an intentional commitment to lovingkindness,” where the Other encompasses all sentient beings and the earth itself. Critic Danielle Poe is drawn to the book’s vulnerability — the way Jack, like the book’s reader, cannot anticipate what the other characters will say — and presses the question of how pragmatic nonviolence responds to those we have wronged: can we afford to invite the anger of the Other toward whom we have been complicit in systemic violence, and if so, how? Critic Sanjay Lal affirms the book’s strength as a demonstration that nonviolent philosophy can command public justification in a pluralist society, but he presses the question whether the “pragmatic” frame is sufficient to generate the revolutionary changes the world needs — invoking Tolstoy’s provocation that a world worth building might require refusing violence even when witnessing a child being killed. Critic Bill Gay affirms the text’s range and notes its usefulness for ethics pedagogy, praising Fitz-Gibbon’s clinic in presenting philosophical traditions in harmony rather than antagonism. Critic Mechthild Nagel asks whether the book’s ethical universe is too anthropocentric, and whether the absence of extended engagement with systemic violence in the criminal justice system limits its reach. Fitz-Gibbon’s reply engages each critic with the same spirit of dialogical openness the book enacts: this is not a completed argument but an evolving one, and the critics’ challenges are welcome encouragements for future development.
Four review pieces anchor the issue’s philosophical inquiry in activist practice and scholarship. Jennifer Fenton contributes a substantial review essay on Marilyn Fischer’s Jane Addams’s Evolutionary Theorizing: Constructing “Democracy and Social Ethics” (University of Chicago Press, 2019), the first of a planned three-volume study. Fischer traces the speeches and articles Addams gave and revised during the first decade of Hull House (1892–1902), demonstrating that Addams was a systematic evolutionary theorist: immersed in Darwin, Mazzini, and the social science of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, she used terms like “association,” “cooperation,” “propinquity,” and “sympathy” not loosely but as technical concepts in an interdisciplinary method of ethical deliberation designed to engage across difference and motivate investment in the Other. Fenton’s review argues that Fischer reveals an Addams who, far from merely applying evolutionary metaphors, reconstructed evolutionary ethics to insist that morality must be cooperative and democratic rather than individualistic. In her reply, Fischer affirms Fenton’s key findings while cautioning against too coherent a recapitulation of Addams’s method — the historical conditions under which Addams worked resisted the kind of systematic exposition that retrospective reconstruction can impose. Sahar Heydari Fard reviews Lisa Fithian’s Shut It Down: Stories from a Fierce, Loving Resistance (Chelsea Green, 2019), reading Fithian’s activist memoir through the lens of complexity theory: Fithian’s argument that decentralized “affinity groups” connected by loose horizontal ties can amplify strategic disruptions into system-level change maps onto the science of scale-free networks and self-organizing systems. Fard affirms Fithian’s practical wisdom while calling for a more explicit bridge between the empirical research on social movements and the tactics Fithian describes. Stephen J. Pidwysocky reviews Rabbi Michael Lerner’s Revolutionary Love: A Political Manifesto to Heal and Transform the World (University of California Press, 2019), finding in Lerner’s program — grounded in the Jewish concept of tikkun olam, the healing of a broken world — an inspiring integration of feminist ethics (Gilligan, Noddings) with two concrete institutional proposals: an Environmental and Social Responsibility Amendment to the US Constitution and a global Generosity/Marshall Plan. David Boersema reviews the collection Revolutionary Nonviolence: Concepts, Cases, and Controversies, edited by Richard Jackson and colleagues and originating in a conference at the University of Otago, New Zealand. The collection’s animating distinction — between reformist nonviolence, which changes leaders and policies while leaving structures of violence intact, and revolutionary nonviolence, which aims at fundamentally transforming social structures and modes of power — runs through all eleven chapters. Boersema notes the book’s welcome attention to New Zealand histories of nonviolence, including traditions rooted in Rongo, the Māori god of peace, as a reminder that the resources for nonviolent philosophy extend well beyond the Western and South Asian canons the field typically draws upon.